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1 Introduction
We often have to decide what to do. We do so based on our credences or beliefs. De-
cisions are often hard to make when we act as individual agents; however, they can be
even harder when we are supposed to act as members of a group, even if we agree on the
values attached to the possible outcomes. Consider, for instance, decisions of members of
a scientific advisory board or research group, or of friends who are deciding which hiking
path to take. Decisions in groups are often harder to make because members of a group
doxastically disagree with each other: they have different doxastic attitudes, for instance,
different credences or beliefs. And when they disagree, they are supposed to find an epis-
temic compromise.
In this paper, I focus on disagreement among members of a group who have different ra-
tional credences, where such credences are represented probabilistically and the rationality
involved is epistemic rationality.1 My main aim is to answer the following question:
Main Question How do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on
a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition?
A standard method of finding such an epistemic compromise is based on Standard Bayesian-
ism. According to the method, the only factors among the agents’ epistemic states that
matter for finding the compromise are the group members’ credences. What I refer to as
the Standard Method of Aggregation, or Weighted Straight Averaging, proposes to settle on
the weighted average of the group members’ credences as the epistemic compromise.2 The
respective weights represent “the level of relative competence” of group members within
the group, where the level is relative to the competence of the other members (Bro¨ssel and
Eder 2014:2362). The Standard Method of Aggregation faces several challenges, of which
I focus on two. They are both due to the fact that the method takes only the (rational)
credences of the members of a group into account, and neglects other factors pertaining to
agents’ (rational) epistemic states.
I take the Standard Method of Aggregation as a starting point, criticize it, and propose to
replace it by what I refer to as the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, which is intro-
duced in Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014 and further developed here.3 According to this method,
1In this paper, I assume that rational credences obey the probability calculus and are updated in
response to the evidence by some conditionalization rule. I say more on rational credences in Sect.3.1.
Admittedly, many interesting cases of disagreement arise because it is not clear whether the credences
involved are rational. However, I have my hands full with cases that involve rational credences and
postpone the discussion of cases where it is not clear whether the credences that are involved are rational.
2For accounts that are in the spirit of Weighted Straight Averaging, see, e.g., Christensen 2007, Elga
2007, and Jehle and Fitelson 2009. And for literature that discusses it in the context of finding an epistemic
compromise see Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014, Frances and Matheson 2019, and Moss 2011.
3I must leave it to another occasion to defend aggregation methods per se and also to discuss alternative
ways of finding compromises.
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the members’ (rational) credences are not the only factors concerning the group agents’
rational epistemic states that matter for finding an epistemic compromise. The method is
based on a non-standard framework of representing rational epistemic states that is more
fine-grained than Standard Bayesianism. I refer to this framework as ‘Dyadic Bayesian-
ism’.4 It distinguishes between an agent’s rational reasoning commitments and the agent’s
total evidence. Rational reasoning commitments reflect how the agent rationally judges
the evidential support provided by some evidence and how the agent rationally reasons on
the basis of the evidence. Like Levi’s (1974/2016, 1980, and 2010) confirmational commit-
ments they are like a rule from the evidence to the doxastic state. The total evidence of the
agent and the agent’s rational reasoning commitments then determine the agent’s rational
credences. On the basis of this framework, the method of aggregation that I defend, the
Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, suggests that disagreeing members of a group ag-
gregate their total evidence and their reasoning commitments—instead of their credences
alone.5
In Section 2, I introduce some assumptions that clarify the focus of the paper: I present
different kinds of doxastic disagreements and specify on which kind of disagreement I con-
centrate. In Section 3, I make some idealizing assumptions and introduce the Standard
Method of Aggregation, which builds on Standard Bayesianism. I end the section by pre-
senting two challenges to the Standard Method of Aggregation: one concerning the fact
that the method does not respect the evidential states of agents, and the other that the
method cannot account for synergetic effects. In Section 4, I propose Dyadic Bayesianism
as an alternative to Standard Bayesianism. I compare it with Levi’s (1974/2016, 1980,
and 2010) framework for representing epistemic states, to which it can be traced, yet
from which it slightly differs. The comparison will help provide a better understanding of
Dyadic Bayesianism. Building on Dyadic Bayesianism, I propose the Fine-Grained Method
of Aggregation as a means of providing an answer to the Main Question, and I discuss the
challenges to the Standard Method of Aggregation in relation to the Fine-Grained Method
of Aggregation. Finally, I summarize my results in Section 5.
2 Kinds of Doxastic Disagreement and Social Settings
In the following section, I present different kinds of doxastic disagreement and their social
settings, albeit without aspiring to present a complete list of either. The kinds of dis-
agreement and the settings that I introduce will suffice to clarify the focus of the present
4In Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014, we use the term ‘Pluralistic Bayesianism’ in contrast to what Schurz
2012 and Unterhuber and Schurz 2013 call ‘Monistic Bayesianism’; the latter corresponds to what we call
‘Standard Bayesianism’.
5In Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014, we focus on the formal properties of the Fine-Grained Method of Aggrega-
tion. Here my focus is more on the philosophical motivation of the account. Furthermore, in Bro¨ssel and
Eder 2014 only reasoning commitments are aggregated. Here evidential states are also aggregated and I
make room for synergetic effects, which are rejected in Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014. I discuss this in more detail
in Sect. 4.4.
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paper.
2.1 Shared vs. Different Total Evidence
Agents might disagree when they do not share the same total evidence but also when they
do. The following example by Feldman describes a case in which agents don’t share the
same total evidence:
Criminal Case Example “Consider [. . . ] the example involving the two suspects in a
criminal case, Lefty and Righty. Suppose now that there are two detectives investi-
gating the case, one who has the evidence about Lefty and one who has the evidence
incriminating Righty. They each justifiably believe in their man’s guilt. And then
each finds out that the other detective has evidence incriminating the other suspect”
(Feldman 2007:208).
Elga presents an example that shows a case in which the agents share the same total
evidence:
Death-Penalty Example “Suppose that you and your friend independently evaluate
the same factual claim—for example, the claim that the death penalty significantly
deterred crime in Texas in the 1980s. Each of you has access to the same crime
statistics, sociological reports, and so on, and has no other relevant evidence. Fur-
thermore, you count your friend as an epistemic peer—as being as good as you at
evaluating such claims.
You perform your evaluation, and come to a conclusion about the claim. But then
you find out that your friend has come to the opposite conclusion” (Elga 2007:484).
Recent literature on disagreement has focused on cases where disagreeing agents share
the same total evidence (before facing disagreement).6,7 However, in social epistemology,
we also need answers to the questions of whether and how to revise credences or how to
find an epistemic compromise for both kinds of cases: when agents who face disagreement
share the same total evidence (before they face disagreement), and when agents who face
disagreement do not share the same total evidence (before they face disagreement). In
this paper, I propose a method that is apt for finding an epistemic compromise when
disagreeing agents share the same total evidence. In addition, given certain circumstances,
the method is also apt when disagreeing agents do not share the total evidence.
6Exceptions are, for example, Feldman 2007 and Grundmann 2013.
7I am concerned with revealed disagreement (Sect. 2.3), where agents who share the same total
evidence continue to share their total evidence after the disagreement is revealed.
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2.2 Coarse-Grained vs. Fine-Grained Disagreements
Agents doxastically disagree with each other with respect to a proposition just in case they
have different doxastic attitudes toward the proposition. It is straightforward to distinguish
between coarse-grained and fine-grained disagreement.8 Imagine, for example, the above
Criminal Case to be such that one detective believes that Lefty is guilty while the other
detective disbelieves this or suspends judgment on it. I refer to such cases of disagreement
as ‘cases of coarse-grained disagreement’, because they concern coarse-grained doxastic
attitudes such as belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Now imagine the Criminal
Case to be such that one of the agents has a specific credence in the proposition that Lefty
is guilty and the other agent has a higher or lower credence in it. I refer to such cases of
disagreement as ‘cases of fine-grained disagreement’. They concern credences which are
fine-grained doxastic attitudes. Note that there are cases where there is no coarse-grained
disagreement, but there is fine-grained disagreement: for instance, cases where both agents
believe a proposition but to different degrees. In this paper, I focus exclusively on fine-
grained disagreement, and will understand or represent credences in probabilistic terms.
2.3 Revealed vs. Unrevealed Disagreement
Many agents disagree with each other without being aware of it. And when they are aware
of it, they might still be unaware whether they share the same total evidence. Or they
might be aware that they disagree with each other and that they share the same total
evidence. More complicated are cases in which the agents are aware that they disagree
and that they do not share the same total evidence. In some of these cases they know
what different pieces of evidence they have; in many cases, however, they do not know the
extent to which their evidence differs. And even when they are aware of the difference
in their total evidence, they might not be aware of how the evidence is judged. And
sometimes they are aware of all those factors and are still in disagreement. I refer to the
latter kind of disagreement as ‘revealed disagreement’. In this paper, I focus exclusively
on such disagreement.
2.4 Social Settings
In the literature, one can find different social settings in which agents face disagreement,
and these might call for different methods for dealing with the disagreement. Following
Wagner (2010:336-337) and Bro¨ssel and Eder (2014:2361-2362), I distinguish three kinds of
social settings.9 The first two concern agents as individuals, and the third concerns agents
as members of a group.
8See also Frances and Matheson 2019 and MacFarlane 2009. This distinction is similar to the distinction
between weak and strong disagreement (for this latter distinction see, e.g., Grundmann 2019).
9See also Easwaran et al. 2016 for different social settings in the context of disagreement.
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First, agents as individuals might disagree with other agents.10 In such a setting, the indi-
vidual agents are all involved in the disagreement: think, for example, of a dispute which
you might have with a friend. Second, agents as individuals might come into contact with
disagreement among other agents. In this kind of setting, an agent who is not involved in
the disagreement experiences other agents who disagree with each other: think of a case
where you have to consult experts who disagree, and who might or might not be aware
of each other. In both kinds of settings, we usually focus on the doxastic attitude that is
rational for an individual agent to hold after becoming aware of the disagreement. Now
consider the third kind of setting: agents as members of a group might face disagreement
and seek to find an epistemic compromise. This compromise is not to be mistaken for the
doxastic states of the members of the group. The crucial difference between this and the
first two kinds of setting is that it does not concern how agents as individuals revise their
doxastic state in the face of disagreement. In the latter, third, kind of social setting, the
members of the group might stick to their individual credences but, for example, decide
to act on the basis of the epistemic compromise as long as they are in that social setting.
(I am neutral on whether one has to stick to the compromise when one is no longer a
member of the group.) The epistemic compromise is also not to be equated with the group
credence. I am neutral on whether there is such a thing as group credences. Even if there
is such a thing, the method for finding an epistemic compromise might be different from
the method for finding the group credences.11 The Criminal Case Example, as well as
the Death-Penalty Example, can be extended to provide examples of the mentioned social
settings (I leave it to the reader to make the required adjustments to these examples). In
this paper, I focus on epistemic compromises.12
In Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014, we assumed that disagreements in all three social settings should
be resolved in the same way. I’m now more cautious, however, and won’t take a stance
here on whether one should treat all of them in the same way. In this paper, I focus on
disagreement among agents as members of a group who are required to find a (rational)
epistemic compromise.
To sum up, in this paper I focus on cases where agents as members of a group are in
revealed, fine-grained (doxastic) disagreement with respect to a proposition, and they are
required to find an epistemic compromise on that proposition. In some such cases they
10See Christensen 2009, Frances and Matheson 2019, Goldman and O’Connor 2019, Lackey 2010 for a
discussion of prominent views on what to do when one faces such a situation.
11For an appealing account of group credence that is analogous to the Standard Method of Aggregation,
see Pettigrew 2019. While our Standard Method of Aggregation refers to epistemic compromises, Pettigrew’s
method concerns group credences. Similarly, Easwaran et al. 2016 (Sect. 2) address aggregation rules
as rules that represent the opinion of a group. However, the opinion may have the same function as the
epistemic compromise: to assist the group in finding decisions.
12Discussions of judgment aggregation are related to discussions in this paper. However, judgment
aggregation concerns the aggregation of categorical doxastic attitudes or of judgments of acceptance and
rejection—as opposed to aggregation of credences (see List 2012, Sect.6.3 for a comparison, and List and
Pettit 2002 and 2004 for judgment aggregations and their problems).
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share the same total evidence and in others they do not.
3 The Standard Method of Aggregation
Before I proceed with a first candidate answer to the Main Question, I introduce idealizing
assumptions most of which are common in probabilistic debates on disagreement. The
idea is to take as starting points precise accounts of representations of epistemic states
and accounts of aggregation and to investigate what follows under the given idealizing
assumptions. The plan is that, based on the results, later investigations will step-by-step
eliminate some of the idealizing assumptions.
3.1 Idealizing Assumptions
Stable Truth-Value
Here, I ignore the possibility that an agent has credences in propositions that change
their truth-values over time: e.g., propositions that change their truth-value as soon as
the agent holds a doxastic attitude towards the propositions. To be on the safe side, I
also ignore the possibility that an agent has credences in propositions that lose or gain
evidential support as a consequence of the agent adopting a doxastic attitude towards the
propositions. Including propositions that change their truth value over time, or that lose or
gain such evidential support, would require us to deal with problems that are not specific
to the problem of finding an epistemic compromise.
True Evidence
I assume that the evidence available to agents is true. This allows us to ignore questions
concerning whether one can rely on the evidence available to other agents or to oneself.
For simplicity, perception and testimony—the primary sources of information about the
world—are taken to be perfectly reliable (see, similarly, Eder and Bro¨ssel 2019).
Ideally Rational Doxastic States
I focus on ideally rational doxastic states. Since I focus on fine-grained disagreement, I
focus on credences as doxastic states. In particular, I assume that the group members who
are required to form an epistemic compromise are agents whose credences are (ideally)
rational in the sense that they do not violate the probability calculus (they are understood
as probabilities) and are updated by a conditionalization rule. Furthermore, by saying that
a credence is (ideally) rational, I do not want to indicate that one is obliged to adopt it;
rather, the credence is merely evaluated as ideal, where the notion of ideal rationality that
I have in mind is evaluative.13
13For an evaluative understanding of (ideal) rationality, see for example Christensen 2004, Easwaran
and Fitelson 2015, Eder 2019, and Titelbaum 2015.
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In probabilistic frameworks, it is common to equate rational epistemic states with rational
credences in the following way14:
Standard Bayesianism “First, a (rational) agent’s epistemic state is best represented
by her (rational) credences alone. Second, (rational) credences obey the probabil-
ity calculus and they are updated by strict conditionalization” (Bro¨ssel and Eder
2014:2360).15
If the members of a group disagree with each other, this is due to them having differ-
ent rational credences, or credence functions. The task of finding a (rational) epistemic
compromise amounts to finding another probability function that all members of the group
can accept as an epistemic compromise, even if they do not accept it as their new credence.
Note that I am happy to accept further principles that restrict the scope of when a cre-
dence or credence function is rational. For instance, I am willing to adopt principles such
as Lewis’s (1980) Principal Principle and van Fraassen’s (1984) Reflection Principle, or
variants thereof. While such principles restrict the set of permissible or rational credence
functions, which are then updated by strict conditionalization when new evidence is ac-
quired, they do not necessarily single out a unique rational credence function. That is, I
do not assume an inter-personal uniqueness principle, according to which two agents ought
to agree on a credence in response to shared evidence.16
3.2 Weighted Straight Averaging
Now that I have specified the setting, let us return to the Main Question: How do mem-
bers of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have
different (rational) credences in the proposition? To answer this question, I first look at
approaches in the literature on how to rationally deal with disagreement. In particular, I
focus on accounts of whether, and if so how, it is rational for individual agents to revise
their credences in the light of disagreement.
According to some approaches in the literature, after becoming aware of the disagreement
it is rational for individual agents not to revise their credences at all (see Frances and Math-
eson 2019 for an overview of such approaches). Whatever the merits of such approaches
for disagreeing agents as individuals, it is certainly not an option to adopt the credence as
an epistemic compromise among members of a group.
14Following Schurz 2012 and Unterhuber and Schurz 2013, Bro¨ssel and Eder (2014) refer to this position
as Monistic Bayesianism.
15For an account in these terms that concerns disagreement, see, e.g., Jehle and Fitelson 2009.
16For literature on uniqueness principles, see Feldman 2007, Kelly 2014, Kopec and Titelbaum 2016,
Rosa 2018, White 2005 and 2014.
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Other approaches suggest it is not (necessarily) rational for agents to retain their doxastic
states, but rather to revise them. There are two prominent approaches of this kind that fit
our probabilistic setting here. According to the first, it is rational for the agent to revise
her credence as she always does: by conditionalizing on the evidence—in this particular
case, by conditionalizing her old credences on the new evidence about the disagreement
with other agents.17 This kind of approach also seems to be wrong-headed for finding an
epistemic compromise. If the group members start with different credence functions, then
they presumably will also have different credence functions after conditionalizing on the
evidence concerning their disagreements. Their a priori credence functions would have
to satisfy various as-yet-unspecified principles to ensure that the group members agree on
some rational epistemic compromise after learning about their disagreement. It is far from
clear how members of a group might end up having an epistemic compromise when they
use a conditionalization rule. I agree with Easwaran et al. (2016), who acknowledge that
the approaches in terms of conditionalization rule are overly demanding.18 One could only
apply such a rule if it were clear how to react to disagreement before one is aware of the
disagreement. So this approach, even if successful, would presuppose that we have found
an answer to our Main Question.
According to the second kind of approach that fits our probabilistic setting here, the agents’
credences are aggregated via rules that combine the individual credence functions of the
disagreeing agents to obtain a single probability function. According to the standard in-
terpretation of these rules in the context of disagreement, the latter function should be
adopted as the new credence function of the disagreeing agents. The most prominent and
most often used aggregation rule will take center stage in the following: the Standard
Method of Aggregation, or Weighted Straight Averaging.19 According to it, the result of
the aggregation should be the weighted average of the initial individual credences.20 The
respective weights of the agents reflect their level of relative (epistemic) competence. It is
assumed that agents have a level of absolute competence which is independent of the level
of competence of other agents. The level of relative competence puts the level of absolute
competence of agents in relation to each other. It does so in such a way that the sum of
the levels of relative competence is one. (I will say more about the weights after presenting
the aggregation rule.)
In detail, Weighted Straight Averaging says the following:
17I take Kelly’s 2010 Total Evidence View to be along these lines. Grundmann describes Kelly’s view
as an account of aggregation of evidence (Grundmann 2019:130-131).
18Nevertheless, Easwaran et al. (2016) provide an account that mimics conditionalization given certain
assumptions.
19There is no room here to discuss all such aggregation rules in detail. In particular, I will ignore the
Geometric Mean Rule. For an extensive discussion of variants of this rule, see Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014,
Easwaran et al. 2016, and Genest and Zideck 1986.
20Since it is a method that results in a single credence (function), Frances and Matheson (2019:Sect.5.1)
refer to it (or a special case of it) as “a kind of doxastic compromise”.
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Weighted Straight Averaging Consider agents s1, . . . , sn, with credence functions PrCrs1 ,
. . . , PrCrsn : the epistemic compromise ECSA[PrCrs1 , . . . ,PrCrsn ] is determined as fol-
lows:
for all propositions p
ECSA[ Pr
Crs1
, . . . , Pr
Crsn
](p) = n∑
i=1 [wi × PrCrsi(p)]
where each agent’s epistemic weight is wi ∈ R+ and for the sum of their weights it
holds that ∑ni=1wi = 1 (see, very similarly, Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014:2367).21
Instead of interpreting the result of the aggregation as the new credence of the agents,
I propose to understand it as providing the rational epistemic compromise of the group.
According to the Standard Method of Aggregation, or Weighted Straight Averaging, finding
the epistemic compromise amounts to more than just averaging the group member’s cre-
dences: it also takes the weights of the individual agents into account. As mentioned before,
these weights are typically taken to reflect the level of relative competence of the agents
in comparison to the other group members’ competence (see Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014). It is
common in social epistemology to focus on peer disagreement, where the agents involved in
the disagreement all have the same competence and thus the same weight. Death-Penalty
Example is a case in point. According to this example by Elga you disagree with a peer,
who is a peer in virtue of “being as good as you at evaluating” the relevant claims.22 It
is common to assume that we can distinguish agents’ competence in a fine-grained way. I
assume that one can assign to each member s1, . . . , sn of a group a precise weight wi within
this group.23 As mentioned before, this weight reflects the level of relative competence of
an agent within this group.24 However, the weight wi of a group member can be assumed
21This rule or variants thereof are often referred to as the ‘Linear Opinion Pooling Rule’.
22Alternative accounts of peerhood not only assume that peers are equally competent but also that
they share the same total evidence (for such an account, see Grundmann 2019). In this paper, I do not
assume that the agents are epistemic peers and that peerhood requires that the agents share the same
total evidence.
23It is common to use such weights in a formal setting (see, among others, Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014,
Easwaran et al. 2016, Genest and Zidek 1986, Moss 2011, Pettigrew 2019).
24In the context of peer disagreement between agents as individuals, there are approaches according
to which it is rational for an agent to move her credence in a proposition towards the credence in the
proposition of a peer with whom she disagrees, but to put more weight on her own credences. This way
she ends up with a credence closer to her initial credence than to the other peer’s initial credence. Within
the present formal setting she can do justice to this by assigning more weight to her own credence even
though all agents involved are equally competent. (See Elga 2007 and Feldman 2007 for a discussion of
what Elga refers to as the Extra Weight View, which is in this spirit. But Elga and Feldman do not
endorse the view. Enoch 2010 argues for the related Common Sense View.) In such a case, the weights
do not reflect the level of relative competence alone. Although such an approach might be adequate in
the context of disagreement between agents as individuals, it is certainly not adequate in the context of
disagreement between agents as members of a group that are supposed to find an epistemic compromise.
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to depend on her level of (unrelativized) competence. Suppose for each member si of a
group one quantifies her level of absolute competence with some number csi ∈ R+. The
weights are then calculated as follows: wi = csi∑ni=1 csi . This would ensure that the weights of
all members of the group sum to one (i.e., ∑ni=1wi = 1) and that equally competent group
members receive the same weight within the group. Note, furthermore, that our assump-
tion that ∑ni=1wi = 1 excludes cases where for all agents si: c(si) = 0 (see also Bro¨ssel and
Eder 2014:2375). That said, I won’t present a general account of competence that tells us
for any situation how to measure the unrelativized notion of competence for any situation
but I simply assume its existence.
Before I turn to objections to the Standard Method of Aggregation, I highlight two im-
portant, well-known properties of the method.25 I will return to them when I discuss the
challenges to the Standard Method of Aggregation in the subsequent sections.
The first property is characterized by the following:
Irrelevance of Alternatives Consider agents s1, . . . , sn with credence functions PrCrs1 ,
. . . ,PrCrsn . Their epistemic compromise on a proposition p depends only on their in-
dividual credences in the proposition p, i.e., ECSA[PrCrs1 , . . . ,PrCrsn ](p) is a function
of PrCrs1(p), . . . ,PrCrsn(p).26
Irrelevance of Alternatives seems attractive because it says that in finding an epistemic
compromise we do not need to discuss and compromise on any other proposition than the
one at hand.
The second well-known property of the Standard Method of Aggregation is that the method
preserves existing agreement. In particular, if the group members all assign the same
credence to a proposition, then the epistemic compromise will settle on the same credence.
This is expressed by the following:
Unanimity If all agents s1, . . . , sn with credence functions PrCrs1 , . . . ,PrCrsn assign the
credence r to the proposition p, then their epistemic compromise on p equals r too,
i.e., ECSA[PrCrs1 , . . . ,PrCrsn ](p) = r, if PrCrsi(p) = r, for all s1, . . . , sn.27
This feature is initially appealing because it is in line with the purpose of finding an
epistemic compromise: if the agents already agree on a proposition, applying the Standard
Method of Aggregation does not change anything.
I cannot think of any reason that would justify putting more weight on the credences of a member of the
group in finding a rational epistemic compromise where all members are equally competent. And in our
setting, there is no reason to take into account non-epistemic factors that determine the weight of an agent
within the group. Here, I assume that the group members’ weights represent their relative competence.
25For a more detailed discussion of these and further properties, see Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014 and, espe-
cially, Genest and Zideck 1986, Jehle and Fitelson 2009.
26This label of the property is common in the literature (see, for example, Jehle and Fitelson (2009).
Sometimes it is also referred to as ‘Strong Setwise Function Property’.
27‘Unanimity’ is also the label Jehle and Fitelson (2009) use.
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3.3 First Challenge: No Respect for Evidence
In the following, I present a challenge that can be raised against the Standard Method
of Aggregation. The challenge is to present an account of aggregation that respects the
evidence. The Standard Method of Aggregation is based on Standard Bayesianism, which
only takes the doxastic state, the credences, of an agent into account. Since Standard
Bayesianism ignores the agent’s evidential state, it ignores important factors of the epis-
temic state of the agent.28 As a first consequence of this, it is not able to accommodate
the relevant difference in competence in acquiring and processing evidence. As a second
consequence, it is not able to accommodate disagreements involving different total evidence.
Let me start by discussing the first consequence. Consider the following example, which
hints at the challenge:
Disagreeing-Physicists Example “[S]uppose, first, theoretical physicist s1 considers
experimental physicist s2 an expert with respect to gathering evidence, but a fool
with respect to the confirmational import of the respective evidence. Accordingly, s1
would like to assume s2’s evidence, but to ignore s2’s judgement of the confirmational
import of the evidence. Or suppose, second, experimental physicist s3 considers
theoretical physicist s4 a fool with respect to gathering evidence, but an expert with
respect to the confirmational import of the given evidence. Accordingly, s3 would
like to ignore what agent s4 accepts as evidence, but to assume s4’s judgement of
the confirmational import of s3’s evidence” (Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014:2372; notation
adapted).
This example makes clear that one better not ignore the evidential states of the agents—as
Standard Bayesianism does. We therefore do not focus on the credences of an agent alone.
As Weatherson emphasizes: “There are two things we assess when evaluating someone’s
beliefs [. . . ] we evaluate both their collection and processing of evidence” (Weatherson
2008: 565). If we dropped our idealizing assumption that the evidence is always true, we
would have to admit that some agents are better at acquiring evidence, and others are bet-
ter at processing it. This should also be mirrored in their weights. Accordingly, an agent
can receive different weights, one concerning the agent’s evidence and another concern-
ing the agent’s processing of the evidence. Discussing group disagreement and epistemic
compromise in the light of evidence that may not be true goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Here, I neglect the weights with respect to the evidential states since I assume that
the agents’ evidence is true and that the agents are perfectly reliable in acquiring it (see
Sect. 3.1.). However, it is a defect of Standard Bayesianism that it can’t even allow for
the difference between the mentioned kinds of weights.29
28My criticism is related to Kelly’s (2010) criticism of the Equal Weight View but different from it.
Here is not the room to compare both.
29Note that I am not claiming that this difference is ignored in social epistemology in general. It might
be standard to make the difference in non-formal epistemology, which does not focus on formally precise
accounts.
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Let’s consider the second consequence of ignoring the agent’s evidential state. Members
of a group might disagree for different reasons. They might disagree because they judge
their evidence differently or because they do not share the same total evidence. An agent
who is better informed and has acquired more evidence might have a different credence in
a proposition than an agent who is less informed and has less evidence. If the members
of a group aggregate their credences, the different total evidence should be considered.
Even if the members of the group are equally competent and receive the same weights, the
difference in their evidence should be taken into consideration. The Standard Aggregation
Method does not account for the difference in evidence or, to be more precise, it is not
adequate when disagreeing members of a group don’t share the same total evidence. Ac-
cording to this method, only the agents’ credences in a proposition are aggregated. Recall,
the Standard Method of Aggregation satisfies Irrelevance of Alternatives. According to it,
only the credences are aggregated. Due to this the Standard Method of Aggregation and
Irrelevance of Alternatives are not as attractive as they might initially seem.
3.4 Second Challenge: No Synergy
The following challenge is one that has been presented in the context of peer disagreement
where agents disagree as individuals; however, it is straightforward to apply it analogously
to the Standard Method of Aggregation as a method of finding an epistemic compromise.
Examples of the following kind motivate the challenge:
Birthday Party Example I Suppose two peers, Anma and Alma, remember that Peter
promised them a year ago that he would come to their birthday party on the weekend.
Both know that Peter never breaks a promise, but they do not consider their memory
to be infallible. Anma ends up with a credence of .7 that Peter will come to the party.
Alma is slightly more confident and assigns credence .9 to the same proposition.30
According to epistemologists such as Christensen (2009), Easwaran et al. (2016), and
Grundmann (2019), it can sometimes be rational for the disagreeing agents to raise their
credence in a proposition even above each of the agents’ initial credences31; the above ex-
ample is provided here as a case in support of this position. Roughly put, even though the
agents disagree on the exact credence, the fact that they both assign a high credence to the
proposition in question makes it rational in the particular situations for them to increase
their probability above both their initial credences. This has been considered a synergetic
effect. Let me be clear: I do not think that the credences alone determine whether there
is a synergetic effect—the circumstances matter. In the example above, there is no doubt
30See Christensen 2009, Easwaran et al. 2016, and Grundmann 2019 for similar examples. Along these
lines, Easwaran et al. (2016) argue for a variant of the Geometric Mean Rule that does justice to such
intuitions. Bro¨ssel and myself (2014) discuss a slightly different variant of the Geometric Mean Rule that
is, in its essence, the same as that of Easwaran et al.. But we reject it based on the rule’s synergetic effect.
31See Easwaran et al. 2016: Sect.6 for further references to the literature in favor of such synergetic
effects.
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about whether Peter breaks promises—both know that he does not. The little doubt that
Anma and Alma have concerns the reliability of their memory. However, the evidence that
the other peer also assigns a high probability to Peter coming to the party provides further
evidence that their memory is not failing, which makes it rational for them to increase a
credence even above .9. I think this would also hold if both had a credence of .9 that Peter
will come to the party. A synergetic effect can seem rational even when the agents share
the same credence in a proposition. Thus, a part of the second challenge is that cases
like the one above speak against the Standard Method of Aggregation and against meth-
ods that satisfy Unanimity. In particular, contra Unanimity, examples such as Birthday
Party Example I suggest that even in the light of an agreement between two agents, the
agents should sometimes increase their probability in a proposition. Applied to epistemic
compromises, this has as a consequence that even if the group members already agree, the
epistemic compromise might differ from their initial credences.
Another part of the challenge is that there are also cases in which a synergetic effect seems
counter-intuitive. I take the following example to be a case in point:
Birthday Party Example II Suppose a few seconds ago, the peers, Anma and Alma,
heard Peter promise that he would come to their birthday party at the weekend.
Both share the same evidence. They both know that Peter sometimes cannot fulfill
his promises and might miss their party. Based on the shared evidence, Anma ends
up with a credence of .7 that Peter will come to the party. Alma is slightly more
confident and assigns credence .9 to the same proposition.
This example supports that it is not always rational to increase one’s probability above both
the initial credences even when they are high. Both agents are aware that circumstances
might be such that they prevent Peter from attending the party. This time, the doubt
does not concern the reliability of Anma’s and Alma’s memories, for they know for certain
that Peter just made the promise and that the other person heard it too. That they both
agree that such circumstances are unlikely is, in that case, not a reason to increase the
probabilities for them even further. If this is correct, it also means that it cannot be a
function of the agents’ credences whether or not a synergetic effect is rational. In Birthday
Party Example I and II, both agents have high credences in the proposition in question,
and in only one example does it seem plausible that both agents should increase their
probability above both their initial credences. The challenge is to answer the question of
how agents can rationally increase their probability above their initial credences in the face
of disagreement, and the answer should not exclusively depend on the agents’ credences. In
both examples, the distribution of credences is the same, but the examples call for different
verdicts. The Standard Method of Aggregation exclusively considers the credences of the
disagreeing agents, thus Irrelevance of Alternatives holds for it. However, in light of both
examples, this does not seem appropriate.
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4 An Alternative Method of Aggregation
The discussion of both challenges indicates that we are in need of an alternative method
of aggregation that considers factors additional to the agents’ credences. The Standard
Method cannot meet the challenges. From the discussion of the challenges, it is apparent
that we need a more fine-grained representation of epistemic states, which does not ex-
clusively consider the credences of agents. I follow Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014, and Eder and
Bro¨ssel 2019, in suggesting such a representation of epistemic states: Dyadic Bayesianism.
Since the framework is non-standard in epistemology in general and in social epistemol-
ogy in particular, I will spend some time introducing it, and comparing it with Levi’s
(1974/2016, 1980, and 2010) similar representation of epistemic states to which it traces
back. Subsequently, I propose what I refer to as the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation.
4.1 Dyadic Bayesianism
Dyadic Bayesianism represents different factors of agents’ epistemic states that are relevant
for finding a well-informed epistemic compromise. Let’s start with the following example
by Elga, which displays such factors:
Weather Forecaster Example “When it comes to the weather, I completely defer to
the opinions of my local weather forecaster. [. . . ] In treating my forecaster this
way, I defer to her in two respects. First, I defer to her information: ‘As far as
the weather goes,’ I think to myself, ‘she’s got all the information that I have—and
more.’ Second, I defer to her judgment : I defer to the manner in which she forms
opinions on the basis of her information” (Elga 2007: 479).
The example shows that the following factors concerning an agent’s epistemic state are
relevant: the agent’s evidence and how the agent reasons on the basis of the evidence. The
following framework takes these factors into account:
Dyadic Bayesianism “An agent s’s (rational) epistemic state is
1. a dyad/ordered-pair ESs = ⟨PrRs , tevs⟩ consisting of (i) s’s [rational] reasoning
commitments, PrRs , and (ii) s’s total evidence, tevs, such that
2. s’s [rational] credences are as follows: PrCrs(p) = PrRs(p∣tevs), and
3. both PrCrs and PrRs obey the probability calculus” (Bro¨ssel and Eder 2019:69).
An agent’s (rational) epistemic state is represented by, first, the agent’s rational reason-
ing commitments and, second, the agent’s total evidence. Rational credences are then
equated with reasoning commitments conditional on the total evidence. This framework is
inspired by, and in many respects similar to, Levi’s framework for representing epistemic
states: he distinguishes between total evidence and confirmational commitments (see, e.g.,
Levi 1974/2016, 1980, 2010). Discussing crucial similarities and differences between these
accounts will clarify Dyadic Bayesianism and what it owes to Levi’s.32
32For related frameworks and discussions see Bro¨ssel 2012, Hawthorne 2005, Lange 1999, Schurz 2012,
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Reasoning Commitments and Levi’s Confirmational Commitments
An agent’s (rational) reasoning commitments, as I understand them, are captured by a
probability function that reflects the agent’s (rational) commitments concerning which
(rational) credences to adopt on the basis of bodies of total evidence.33 That is, they
reflect how to reason from the evidence. In some sense, my reasoning commitments can be
understood as bearing a close similarity to Williamson’s (2000) objective evidential prob-
abilities and Carnap’s (1950) logical probabilities. However, reasoning commitments are
understood in a more subjective fashion. According to Williamson, objective evidential
probabilities measure “something like the intrinsic plausibility of hypotheses prior to inves-
tigation” (2000:211). The objective evidential probability of a proposition, or hypothesis,
on some evidence, reflects the plausibility of the proposition given the evidence, before the
evidence is acquired. For Carnap, logical probabilities represent the logical plausibility of a
proposition given the evidence in question. The logical probability of the proposition given
the evidence reflects a logical or a priori relation between the evidence and the proposi-
tion.34 One can understand the reasoning commitments in a similar way, except that they
are subjective evidential probabilities that measure the “intrinsic plausibility of hypotheses
prior to investigation” as subjectively judged by the agent. Note that, as with credences or
credence functions, I do not assume that there is a unique rational reasoning commitment
function. Reasoning commitments also reflect how agents are committed to processing
their evidence, i.e., what credences to adopt on various evidential bases. In particular,
the reasoning commitments concerning a proposition conditional on some total evidence
reflects the agent’s subjective judgment of the evidential support provided by the evidence
for the proposition. The reasoning commitment concerning a proposition conditional on
some total evidence is tightly linked to the plausibility of the proposition given the evidence
prior to any investigation and prior to acquiring any evidence. (Connoisseurs of Carnap
and Levi might notice that my account is in this respect more in line with Carnap than
with Levi (cf. Levi 2010:Sect.7). Note that for Levi, judgments of evidential support make
sense only when they concern an expansion of the agent’s total evidence, i.e, the agent’s
full belief. However, we are not concerned with full belief here.)
Reasoning commitments reflect “the judgements of the confirmational import of the evi-
dence, which capture how agents justify their credences” (Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014: 2373).
Reasoning commitments play an important role for agents in justifying their credences.
For justifying one’s credence in a proposition, one states one’s evidence and the reasoning
commitments that lead to the credence. And when we criticize someone’s credences as un-
justified, we can trace them back to either their evidence or their reasoning commitments
(or both). Similarly, Carnap (1950) envisioned that we would use logical probabilities to
and Unterhuber and Schurz 2013. Unfortunately, there is no room here to deal with those frameworks and
discussions.
33Here Levi and I agree, see the next paragraph.
34For literature on Carnap’s logical probabilities, see Ha´jek 2019, Leitgeb and Carus 2020, Levi 2010,
and Maher 2006.
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justify credences. Accordingly, one’s credence would be justified by stating one’s evidence
and by referring to the logical probability of the proposition conditional on the available
evidence.
Levi characterizes confirmational commitments as rules that do not need to be understood
or represented as probabilities:
X’s state of full belief K cannot, in general, determine X’s state B of credal
probability judgements by itself. It needs to be supplemented by what I call a
“confirmational commitment” (Levi 1974, 1979, 1980, Chap. 4) which is a rule
specifying for each potential state of full belief relevantly accessible to X what
X’s credal state should be, when X is in that set of full belief. (Levi 2010: 99)
Analogous to my position concerning reasoning commitments, Levi assumes that confir-
mational commitments determine an agent’s credal state. In particular, an agent’s credal
state is determined by the agent’s full beliefs and her confirmational commitments.
It is noteworthy that reasoning commitments, as well as confirmational commitments, can
change over time. Sometimes such changes are adequate when agents face disagreement
with other agents, and the evidence about the disagreement indicates that one had better
change one’s reasoning commitments. (See Levi 2010 for changes in confirmation commit-
ments upon facing disagreement and Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014 for such changes in reasoning
commitments upon facing disagreement.)
A main difference between reasoning commitments and Levi’s confirmational commitments
is that confirmational commitments are rules that assign a set of probability functions to
each logically closed set of full beliefs. I assume reasoning commitments are a single
probability function, a position that Levi rejects (Levi 2010: 102).
Credences and Levi’s Credal States
As mentioned several times, according to Dyadic Bayesianism, agents’ credences are de-
termined by the agents’ reasoning commitments and their total evidence. Similarly, for
Levi, agents’ credal states are determined by the agents’ confirmational commitments and
their total evidence. However, for Levi (2010) an agent’s credal state is a set of conditional
probability functions defined for all pairs of propositions ⟨p, q⟩ such that p is a proposition
and q is a proposition compatible with the agent’s total evidence. For me, an agent’s credal
state is (represented by) a single probability function.
A Merit of Dyadic Bayesianism
Following many epistemologists engaged in this debate, I have focused on doxastic dis-
agreement. In Section 2.2, I characterized it as a mismatch between the doxastic states
of agents toward a proposition. Unfortunately, the literature tends to neglect other kinds
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of relevant mismatches. Doxastic disagreement is not the only form of mismatch relevant
for finding an epistemic compromise. A merit of the current approach, and of Dyadic
Bayesianism in particular, is that it allows us to distinguish different kinds of mismatches.
In addition to doxastic disagreement, agents might have different reasoning commitments;
I refer to such mismatches as ‘reasoning mismatches’. (Recall Birthday Party Example
II. This example reveals a reasoning mismatch between Anma and Alma. They have the
same total evidence, but they process it differently—which is reflected in different reason-
ing commitments—and, thus, end up having different credences.) Agents might also have
different evidence. I refer to such a mismatches as ‘evidential mismatches’ (see similarly
Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014:2373, where we use the term ‘disagreement’ instead of ‘mismatch’).
These two additional notions of mismatch allow us to more thoroughly analyze the poten-
tial reasons for doxastic disagreement. Agents are in doxastic disagreement because they
are in evidential mismatch or because they are in reasoning mismatch. Note, however, that
agents might be in doxastic agreement and still be in evidential or reasoning mismatch.
Consider, for example, cases where we doxastically agree with a colleague with respect to
a proposition but have different reasoning commitments that lead to the doxastic agree-
ment.35 It is not possible to do justice to such a case within Standard Bayesianism, and it
is a merit of Dyadic Bayesianism that it makes it possible to model the mentioned sources
of doxastic disagreement as well as the various mismatches that might underlie doxastic
agreement.
4.2 The Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation
In Dyadic Bayesianism, the framework advocated here, an agent’s (rational) evidential
state and (rational) reasoning commitments together determine the agent’s (rational) cre-
dences. Thus, as mentioned before, when the members of a group doxastically disagree
with each other, this is so because they are either in evidential mismatch or in reasoning
mismatch. These mismatches are then the source of the doxastic disagreement. Instead of
merely aggregating the credences of the agents in order to find an epistemic compromise,
what needs to be aggregated are their evidential states and their reasoning commitments.
The epistemic compromise concerning a proposition is then the result of both aggregations.
Aggregating Evidential States
As a first step to finding an epistemic compromise, group members need to come to a
compromise concerning their evidential states. Given the strong idealizing assumption
that we introduced in the previous subsection, coming to such an epistemic compromise is
straightforward. I assumed that the group members are fully reliable in collecting evidence.
Recall that I assume that they only receive true propositions as evidence (see Sect.3.1). As
35This difference in reasoning commitments may also yield doxastic disagreement about higher-order
propositions, e.g., propositions about which reasoning commitments or ways of processing evidence are
more adequate. However, this disagreement about higher-order propositions would be different to a dis-
agreement with respect to the original proposition in question or to the reasoning mismatch.
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a consequence, the evidential states of all agents are true and they are logically compatible
with each other. Given this assumption, it is rational for the group members to accept
each others’ pieces of evidence (cf. Disagreeing-Physicists Example and Weather Forecaster
Example). The aggregated evidential state is the conjunction of the members’ evidential
states.36 As a consequence, if the members share the same total evidence, then the ag-
gregated evidential state is just this shared evidence. The members’ total evidence is not
double-counted since the conjunction of the members’ total evidence is logically equivalent
to each member’s total evidence. A further consequence is that if a group member receives
a piece of evidence, then the whole group would accept this piece of evidence.
Method for Aggregating Evidential States Consider agents s1, . . . , sn, with epistemic
states ES1, . . . ,ESn and corresponding evidential states tevs1 , . . . , tevsn . Then the
compromise for the evidential states of the group ECES[tevs1 , . . . , tevsn] is determined
as follows:
ECES[tevs1 , . . . , tevsn] = tevs1 ∧ . . . ∧ tevsn
The idealizing assumptions that lead to this method for aggregating evidential states are
strong. They need to be relaxed, and this would lead us to use a more nuanced method
for aggregating evidential states. Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez (2011) introduce and discuss
various merging operators that deal with conflicting bodies of evidence. To my knowledge,
probability-based methods for aggregating evidential states have not been discussed in
literature on disagreement.37 To discuss them, however, is a task for another time.
Aggregating Reasoning Commitments
In addition to a method for aggregating evidential states, we need a method for aggregating
reasoning commitments. Following Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014, I propose to aggregate reasoning
commitments as follows:
Method of Aggregating Reasoning Commitments Consider agents s1, . . . , sn, with
epistemic states ES1, . . . ,ESn and corresponding reasoning commitments PrRs1 , . . . ,PrRsn :
the epistemic compromise concerning the reasoning commitments ECR[PrRs1 , . . . ,PrRsn ]
for all propositions p is determined as follows:
ECR[Pr
Rs1
, . . . , Pr
Rsn
](p) = n∑
i=1wi × PrRsi(p)
where wi ∈ R+ and ∑ni=1wi = 1.
36Things are more complicated when we do not assume that the evidence is true. Unfortunately, here is
not the room to develop a formally precise account of aggregation of evidential states that works without
this assumption.
37Such methods should be able to deal with uncertain evidence, that is, evidence we are not certain of.
The latter kind of evidential input is the input required for Jeffrey conditionalization.
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The weights wi in this method are best understood as reflecting the level of relative com-
petence of an agent concerning how the agent reasons on the basis of various possible
evidential states. As an example of someone who is highly competent in this regard, con-
sider our (theoretical) physicist who can judge the evidential import of various pieces of
evidence better than her colleagues. Such a physicist might be assigned a high weight
regardless of whether she collects evidence herself.
According to the method, the reasoning commitments of the group members are aggregated
into a single probability function. The result is considered to be the epistemic compromise
concerning how to reason on the basis of various potential evidential states.38
Epistemic Compromise
The two aggregation methods together provide us with an epistemic compromise concerning
the epistemic states of the group members. It is determined as follows:
Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation Consider agents s1, . . . , sn, with epistemic states
ESs1 , . . .ESsn : the epistemic compromise EC[ESs1 , . . . ,ESsn] is determined as follows:
EC[ESs1 , . . . ,ESsn] = ⟨ECR[Pr
Rs1
, . . . , Pr
Rsn
],ECES[tevs1 , . . . , tevsn]⟩
In what follows, I discuss how the new method for finding an epistemic compromise deals
with the mentioned objections.
4.3 Respect for Evidence
A challenge that the Standard Method of Aggregation does not adequately meet is to re-
spect the evidence of the disagreeing members of a group. It cannot respect it because it
focuses only on the (rational) credences of the agents. This is so because it is based on
Standard Bayesianism, which does not differentiate between evidence, (rational) reasoning
commitments, and (rational) credences.
The Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation is based on a framework for representing epis-
temic states that is fine-grained in the sense that it differentiates between evidence, rea-
soning commitments, and credences, i.e., Dyadic Bayesianism. Consequently, the method
allows us to take the difference between evidence, reasoning commitments, and credences
38Lasonen-Aarnio 2013 briefly considers views such as the one presented here and in Bro¨ssel and Eder
2014, and a similar view by Rosenkranz and Schulz 2015; however, she ultimately rejects them, among
other reasons because she believes “the resulting views raise a plethora of technical worries. For instance
the kinds of updates may not leave [the agents] with a probabilistically coherent function” (Lasonen-Aarnio
2013: 782). At least some of the technical worries can be overcome by the view presented here and in
Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014. I leave a discussion of her arguments against positions such as ours for another
occasion, and here concentrate on demonstrating the merits of our view.
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into account. One can aggregate the evidence of the agents who are required to find an
epistemic compromise while considering their competence in acquiring evidence. At the
same time, one can separately aggregate the reasoning commitments of the agents, taking
into account their competence in responding to the evidence. Once one has the evidence
and the reasoning commitments aggregated, one also has the epistemic compromise as a
result.
As a further consequence, the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation can be employed to
find an epistemic compromise even when the disagreeing members of a group do not share
the same total evidence. If, as we assumed, the group members’ evidence only includes
true propositions, they can accumulate their evidence to obtain a larger body of evidence.
This method respects the evidence of each group member.
4.4 No Synergy
The second challenge is to answer the question of how agents can rationally increase their
probability above their initial credences in the face of disagreement, and the answer should
not exclusively depend on the agents’ credences. The Standard Method of Aggregation can-
not meet the challenge, because it is built on a framework for representing epistemic states
that focuses solely on credences. According to it, the new probability (i.e., the epistemic
compromise) is between the initial credences. Contra the Standard Method of Aggrega-
tion, the answer to the challenge should not depend exclusively on the agent’s credences.
In Section 3.4, I presented two examples of disagreement that involve the same credence
distributions: Birthday Party Example I and II. Only in one of them did increasing the
probability above the initial credences seem rational for the agents.
Based on the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, I propose the following to meet the
challenge: the differentiating feature between both examples is the evidence. In some
situations, if a member of a group learns that the other members have additional pieces
of evidence in support of a proposition that the member does not have, the member ac-
quires extra evidence in support of the proposition: evidence of evidence. According to
Feldman’s slogan, evidence of evidence is evidence. Although the slogan is not always
correct,39 in those cases in which evidence of evidence is evidence (for some proposition), it
can provide a reason to agree to an epistemic compromise above the initial credences of the
group members. This evidence of evidence would provide extra evidence for the proposition
in question. The resulting evidential states are aggregated and allow for a synergetic effect.
In contrast, imagine members of a group who disagree concerning a proposition and share
the same total evidence. Imagine furthermore that by revealing the doxastic disagreement,
the members do not receive any evidence of evidence in support of the proposition. Since
the members share the same total evidence and have different credences in the proposition
39See Eder and Bro¨ssel 2019.
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in question, they just learn that the reasoning commitments are different. However, that
the members judge the evidential support provided to the proposition in question differ-
ently provides no reason for adopting more extreme reasoning commitments that assign an
even higher credence to the proposition. There is no reason to change the evidential states.
The result of the aggregation of the evidential states is the same as the members’ initial
total evidence. And according to our Method for Aggregating Reasoning Commitments,
the result of the aggregation of the different initial reasoning commitments is between
them. Consequently, the epistemic compromise is also between the group members’ ini-
tial credences.40 I cannot think of a reason that allows for a synergetic effect in such a case.
In the following, I illustrate the answer to the second challenge by applying it to our two
examples: Birthday Party Example I and II.
First, consider Birthday Party Example I. For both agents, Anma and Alma, it is each one’s
memory that is the relevant evidence that supports high credence in the proposition that
Peter will attend their joint birthday party at the weekend. In disclosing the disagreement,
the agents receive evidence that the other agent also remembers Peter making the promise:
this is the relevant evidence of evidence. The fact that they both remember him making
the promise is what provides extra evidence for assuming that Peter indeed promised he
would come to the party. And since they know that Peter keeps his promises, it is rational
to increase the probability of Peter’s attendance above both initial credences. Learning
that different pieces of evidence, i.e., different memories, support the same proposition is
why it is rational for both agents to increase the probability above their initial credences.
Imagine there were more group members who remembered Peter making the promise: this
would provide more evidence for the group in support of Peter’s attendance. Since he al-
ways keeps his promises, the group would be rational in assigning a very high probability,
a probability higher than the group member’s initial credences, in the proposition that
Peter will attend Anma and Alma’s joint birthday party.
Now consider Birthday Party Example II. Here, both agents have the same total evidence—
a few seconds ago, Peter promised he would come to Anma and Alma’s joint birthday party.
Anma and Alma do not fully rely on Peter’s promise. They know that circumstances might
prevent him from attending the party. Their predictions differ only slightly. In disclosing
the disagreement, the agents do not receive relevant evidence of evidence in support of the
proposition in question. There is no reason to add something to their evidential states that
supports the proposition. The aggregation of the shared evidential state results in the same
evidential state. That Anma has reasoning commitments that assign a credence of .7 to the
proposition that Peter will attend Anma and Alma’s joint birthday party at the weekend,
and that Alma assigns a credence of .9, is not a reason for them to assume reasoning
commitments that commit them to an even higher probability. And even if more and more
agents had similar reasoning commitments, this would not be a reason to adopt reasoning
40See Bro¨ssel and Eder 2014:2380.
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commitments that make it certain that Peter will come—after all, everyone agrees that
Peter does not always keep his promises. The result of the aggregation of the reasoning
commitment is between the initial reasoning commitments, and the same holds for the
credences (recall there is no change in evidential states). No synergetic effect arises.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have focused on revealed, fine-grained disagreement among members of a
group who are required to find a rational epistemic compromise. A promising way of finding
such a compromise is by aggregating the members’ epistemic states. Standard Bayesianism
focuses on the agents’ credences and represents the credences as probabilities; and the
Standard Method of Aggregation aggregates the credences, or probabilities. I discussed
challenges to that method: first, it does not respect the evidential state of agents, which,
however, is crucial for finding an epistemic compromise. Second, it is not able to account for
cases with synergetic effects, where the epistemic compromise is not to be found between
the agents’ credences. The method that I propose, the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation,
is able to meet the challenges adequately.
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